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For Gerty Had Her Dreams that
No-one Knew Of
Philip Weinstein

A feminist account of "Nausicaa" might begin by noting that, until the 1980s,
it has been read—canonically and with gender indifference—as a comic ex
posure of Gerty's dreams of her own uniqueness. Thanks to Joyce's liberating
techniques, her entrapping dreams have been precisely what we all know
about. This widely shared reading polarizes Joyce's stylistic flexibility against
Gerty's rigidity by splitting the chapter into the gazed-upon antics of Gerty
versus the unco-opted thoughts of Bloom. As Patrick McGee has warned,
however, this reading naturalizes and hierarchizes opposing styles, genders,
genres. I'd like to probe Gerty's "dreams that no-one knew of" in two ways:
first, by analyzing the cultural activity that produces such dreams, and second,
by destabilizing the polarity between Gerty as caught and Bloom as free. As
Eve Sedgwick has argued with respect to Proust, the highlighting of one
closet—one arena that is being exposed—often implies the strategic con
cealing of another, this one less amenable to assessment. I'll try to identify that
other, concealed closet.
Gerty's foolishness was always highlighted, but, beginning with Suzette
Henke a decade ago, we've begun to analyze her more precisely as a creature
of her culture. Modern advertising has generated the lineaments of her sub
jectivity. Her body has been relentlessly trained to accede to her society's gen
der directives: iron-jelloids, Widow Welch's female pills, lemon juice, queen of
ointments, Mme Vera Verity, Princess Novelette, Clery's summer sales, "eye
browleine," the newest thing in footwear. . . . The list is long and familiar.
Gerty is wholly tracked within a narrative of ersatz satisfactions that will ap
parently make up for—but actually energize forever—the class- and gendercaused poverty of her life. In Althusser's terms, she has been interpellated—
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"Hey you!" the ads have proclaimed, and by responding "Me? You mean, Me?"
she has defined herself as a woman with "dreams no-one knew of" and been
defined as a woman in thrall to those same culturally dispensed dreams. Sub
jectivity and ideology are mutually constitutive terms; in Gerty we see their
virtually formulaic fusion.
Twenty years ago Gerty's cliches were an easy target. Cliche' itself was a
safely delimited term, for the text seemed effectively to distinguish between
its own free language on the one hand and Gerty's entrapping language on
the other. There was little attempt to see what it might mean more generally
to speak other peoples' language. (We of course spoke our own—this went
without saying.) Since then, Bakhtin and Foucault have shown us the sense
in which we always speak other peoples' language, that the social/ideological
aspect of being in language is irresistible. "The ideological becoming of a
human being . . . is the process of selectively assimilating the word of others"
Bakhtin writes in "Discourse in the Novel" (341). To speak is to enact group
affiliation; selfhood is inalienably social, an affair of others.
Foucault has argued further, in Discipline and Punish, that the body is so
cially programmed at all times, and that this programming is consensual, not
inflicted. "The body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body
and a subjected body," he writes (26). Subjected and subjectified as well, so that
inscription and desire are no longer opposed but welded: "and her face was suf
fused with a divine, an entrancing blush . . . and he could see her other things
too, nainsook knickers, the fabric that caresses the skin, better than those
other pettiwidth, the green, four and eleven, on account of being white and
she let him" (U-GP 13:723-26). In the midst of this erotic flow comes the price
of the garments, and that phrase—"the fabric that caresses the skin"—that
registers simultaneously the ad Gerty has ingested and the flush that she feels
as it does its promised job. This fetishized object, like those others clustered in
Gerty's "girlish treasure trove" (LJ-GP 13:638-39), reifies Gerty into an as
sortment of culturally validated icons of self-worth. These mirror back to her
where she has come from ("her child of Mary badge"), where she is going (to
capture a man), and how she will do it: by guising herself in guaranteed apparel.
This Foucault/Althusser reading might close by noting that men at every
point pace and inflect Gerty's erotic narrative: it is Father Conroy who "told
her that time when she told him about that in confession . . . not to be
troubled because that was only the voice of nature and we were all subject to
nature's laws, he said, in this life and that that was no sin because that came
from the nature of woman instituted by God, he said, and that Our Blessed
Lady herself said to the archangel Gabriel be it done unto me according to
Thy Word" (U-GP 13:453-59). The male-dispensed Catholic narrative con
cedes and contains female sexuality by not naming it. Menstruation's studied
referent is "that" and Gerty is not to worry because God has instituted "that."
Through the triply masculine filters of God, Gabriel, and Father Conroy, Gerty
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receives her sexual message: that it will be done unto her in the appropriate
ways, and that the vicissitudes of desire itself—which she knows only as sen
sation on the skin and the scalp, and which she can refer to only as "this" or
as "a thing like that," certainly distinct from "the other thing," which you
weren't supposed to do—have been foreseen and mapped by the Church.
Gerty's lexical vagueness here is destiny itself: the words "that," "this," and
"thing" are forced to do duty for crucial distinctions—menstruation, lust, mas
turbation, intercourse—for which it is of the first importance to have differ
ential language in order to access them, interrelate them, and generate out of
their differences a minimally liberated sexual identity.
Gerty has hardly a clue as to her problem. Power acts upon her molecu
larly, not coercively. Her social inscription registers precisely at those unself
conscious moments when she punctuates her narrative by proclaiming who
she "instinctively" is. The word "instinct" (or its cognates) occurs as noun, ad
jective, or adverb four times in her narrative, at each point naturalizing her
sense of self and revealing to us the nodes of her social construction: "Gerty
was dressed simply but with the instinctive taste of a votary of Dame Fashion"
(U-GP 13:148), "because she felt instinctively that he was like no-one else"
(U-GP 13:428), "her woman's instinct told her that she had raised the devil
in him" (L/-GP 13:517), "from everything in the least indelicate her finebred
nature instinctively recoiled" (L7-GP 13:660-61). In these instances we find
the bedrock word—instinct—employed to guarantee the inbred (rather
than trained) quality of her clothing choices, the natural (rather than gen
der-taught) character of her desire for Bloom, and the morally immaculate
tenor of her otherwise dubious sexual escapade. In these ways her vocabulary
legitimates her behavior, confirms her unique identity, and arrests her in
mystification.
This reading of Gerty seems to me unanswerable, but there has recently
emerged a feminist counterreading that proposes a Gerty MacDowall who is
not simply victimized. Embodying desire and revealing under closer scrutiny a
complex erotic agenda, this Gerty MacDowall does not serve as a passive mir
ror for male sexual affirmation. Rather, the mirror moves on its own, using the
gazing male as the stimulant for its own reflexive pleasures, neatly reversing
the paradigm. Kimberly Devlin makes this feminist and Lacanian argument,
proposing a Gerty who manages, in a male-defined culture, to achieve jouiS'
sance on condition that it escape the Catholic censor; a Gerty viewed as the
site of linguistic disturbance rather than a fixed and silly figure. There remains
one further dimension to the resurrection of Gerty, perhaps the most sugges
tive of all, for it refuses the high culture/low culture binary that has conde
scendingly subtended our treatment of this chapter. I am thinking of Margot
Norris's work on "Nausicaa" and even more of Jennifer Wicke's analysis of the
place of advertising in modern culture. Showing that the subject's absorp
tion of advertising enables a metempsychotic journey—"in and through
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consumption, in all its array, a transmigration of subjectivity is enacted into
objects and back again" (L7-GP 13:761)—Wicke argues for a Molly Bloom
actively, coherently, invested in the work of consuming, not idly or passively
victimized by it. In similar manner, Gerty MacDowall lives her cultural fur
nishing: "the fabric that caresses the skin" does indeed caress it, and she has
cogently decked herself out in the garb, manners, thoughts, and feelings—all
culturally proposed—that permit her sexual release. I realize this low-cultural
analysis of everyday viability is in tension with the high-cultural one that be
moans her victimization; both make sense to me. Rather than explore either
further, I turn instead to Bloom.
It is here, with Bloom, that our commentary has altered the least. Put oth
erwise, what imaginary arrangements are we still protecting through this pre
served reading? Joyce's prose for him is so welcome after Gerty's sticky rhetoric
that even if we grant that stream of consciousness now emerges (after four
chapters without it) as a style—rather than as nature itself—even so, we have
tended to let him run away with the chapter. I'd like to begin a reading of
Bloom that is more aware of his gendered optic.
First, consider his focus on menstruation: "near her monthlies, I expect,
makes them feel ticklish" (f-GP 13:777-78), "How many women in Dublin
have it today?" (U-GP 13:781-82), "Devils they are when that's coming on
them" (822), "Wonder if it's bad to go with them then. Safe in one way. Turns
milk, makes fiddlestrings snap" (U-GP 13:825-26), "Some women, instance,
warn you off when they have their period. Come near. Then get a hogo you
could hang your hat on" (U-GP 13:1031-32). Granted, these speculations live
among hundreds of others about the strange smells and behavior of fish, bats,
dogs, and other creatures. The point is that women are inexhaustibly strange
for Bloom—other, arousing, disturbing, creaturely—and their difference from
men (which he seems to construe as natural—"Who did you learn that from?
Nobody.... O don't they know!" [U-GP 13:924-25]) ceaselessly interests him.
Women are routinely referred to in his narrative in the plural. His text
abounds with generalizations about what "they" do. "Because they want it
themselves. Their natural craving" (U-GP 13:790-91), "Excites them also
when they're. I'm all clean come and dirty me. And they like dressing one an
other for the sacrifice" (U-GP 13:797-98), and perhaps most succinctly this
tableau: "Tableau! O, look who it is for the love of God! How are you at all?
What have you been doing with yourself? Kiss and delighted to, kiss, to see
you. Picking holes in each other's appearance. You're looking splendid. Sister
souls. Showing their teeth at one another. How many have you left? Wouldn't
lend each other a pinch of salt" (U-GP 13:815-20). Tableau indeed: the pic
ture that emerges here is as saturated in a culture's gender assumptions as
Gerty's pictures were. Only here the bias is subtler, diffused within the shape
lessness of stream of consciousness and widely shared by the text's male read
ership. Women fawn upon each other, vie with each other for attractive males,
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are deceitful, selfish, and as free from guilt as cats. Their narcissism is hyp
notic. Bloom has no hesitancy in so categorizing them, and no interest in the
social forces that may have produced this kind of behavior. His narrative for
women is as dependent upon instinct terms as Gerty's was: "Where do they
get that? Typist going up Roger Greene's stairs two at a time to show her un
derstandings. Handed down from father to, mother to daughter, I mean. Bred
in the bone" (U-GP 13:916-18).
Bred in the bone. We understand that today to mean so deeply trained into
us that it passes as nature, is invisible. And Bloom's portion in "Nausicaa" has
likewise passed as largely invisible, from a gender perspective. I suggest that this
has occurred because the text rises out of and speaks to a male imaginary for
whom the female is both innocent and arousing, erotic yet receptive: "all the
dirty things I made her say" (U-GP 13:868). If the exposed closet in the first
half of "Nausicaa" is Gerty's "dreams that no-one knew of," then the concealed
one is Bloom's own sexual imaginary, one that much of Joyce's readership
seems to share, an imaginary that we would indulge in, yet have no one know
about, a set of dreams we have no intention of spotlighting as cultural script.
Gerty's fantasies are laid open for symbolic assessment; Bloom's are imagi
narily shared, in secret. She is there for our delectation: first, the precoital
spectacle of her being aroused by Bloom, then the postcoital dignity of Bloom's
wide-ranging thoughts. This arrangement too is gender shaped—the opening
up of the female's excitement, the private voyeurism of the male's detumes
cence—for when we finally enter Bloom's mind his thoughts "cap" hers and
he is already, so to speak, safely zipped. The "we" parading throughout these
last paragraphs is, of course, male. But many females have participated within
its confines, we now can say, for it takes a feminist stance to nudge biological
differences out of a pregiven polar opposition and to reveal gender positions
as culturally produced.
I want to close by touching briefly on the question of male feminism itself.
Stephen Heath's arresting claim—"men's relation to feminism is an impossible
one"—seems to me both irrefutable and unacceptable (1). Irrefutable, be
cause men just are the problem of feminism, the source—embodied locally
and operative systemically—of the injustice women suffer from. After dis
mantling Freud's claim that anatomy is destiny, feminists have retaught us the
vicious ways in which it still is destiny. Men grow up differently, encounter so
cial structures shaped preferentially for them, enjoy a time-and-power curve
the reverse of women's.
But Heath's argument is also unacceptable, inasmuch as men (once they
see the light) cannot but attempt (Heath included) to be feminists. Patrick
McGee rightly claims that this attempt on our part is more than a matter of
choice, by which I think he means that in involuntary ways we remain com
plicit in a male structure of privilege; but this attempt is also not simply a
choice, inasmuch as we must be feminists—as we must oppose racism and
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write against it, even though, if we are white, we are also complicit. Maleness
(biological and cultural) is and is not our destiny: insofar as it is not we strug
gle to inhabit our maleness in a feminist way, revising our take on matters we
had misread. I think we must be off-balance, unauthoritative, seeking neither
to cash in on the central work done by women feminists nor to posture
masochistically as hopelessly at fault and out of place on this terrain.
The two more radical alternative positions I know of are even less tenable:
to assume in advance that our maleness invalidates any feminist stance we
might articulate, or to envisage a wholesale dismantling of male and female
altogether. A different way of being male, intent upon a more generous spec
trum of relations to the female—this seems to me to be a worthwhile goal for
any male feminist whose aim is to undo privilege, not to remove difference
(including the eroticism of difference). Nausicaan comedy delights in the di
alogic interplay (rather than melodramatic opposition) of norm and subver
sion, commodification and desire, containment and release, erotics male and
female. Our own maleness neither licenses a special insight into Joyce's writ
ing of gender in "Nausicaa" nor condemns us in advance to irrelevance. The
best we can do may be to keep at it in our mix of good and bad faith, useful
both in our critique of the postures we identify and in our being demonstra
bly caught up in them nevertheless.
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